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Abstract. Transient Secure Association has been widely accepted as a
possible alternative to traditional authentication in the context of Ubi-
quitous Computing. In this paper we develop a formal model for the
Resurrecting Duckling Policy that implements it. Our model, that we
call TSA systems, is based on Petri Nets, thus obtaining an amenable
graphical representation of our systems. We prove that TSA specifica-
tions have the same expressive power as P/T nets, so that coverability,
that can be used to specify security properties in this setting, is decidable
for TSA systems. Then we address the problem of implementing TSA
systems with a lower level model that only relies on the secure exchange
of secret keys. We prove that if we view these systems as closed systems
then our implementation is still equivalent to P/T nets. However, if we
consider an open framework then we need a mechanism of fresh name
creation to get a correct implementation. This last model is not equiva-
lent to P/T nets, but the coverability problem is still decidable for them,
even in an open setting, so that checking the security properties of the
represented systems remains decidable.
1 Introduction
The term Ubiquitous Computing was coined by Mark Weiser [21] to describe
environments full of devices that compute and communicate with its surrounding
context and, furthermore, interact with it in a highly distributed but pervasive
way [20]. This computing paradigm gives rise to a great deal of new situations
that produce new problems, in the context of mobility, coordination and security,
among others. For a survey of the challenges posed by Ubiquitous Computing
see [10].
As mentioned above, the new framework of ubiquitous computing affects
traditional security assumptions. Authentication is probably the major security
problem for ubiquitous systems, since it is a precondition for other properties
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2as confidentiality or integrity. But in this new context, we can no longer rely on
an always online policy, due to the unreliable nature of ad hoc nets. Thus, we
cannot approach the problem of authentication by assuming the existence of an
online server that verifies in real time the (global) identity of principals, nor the
existence of public key repositories.
In order to solve this problem, several weak forms of authentication that
substitute global identity-based authentication have been proposed. One of the
proposals is that of Transient Secure Association, implemented by the Resurrec-
ting Duckling Policy [18]. This policy is based on the fact that sometimes a
principal may not know anything at all about some concrete device (e.g., when
a user has just bought a PDA), but still it wants to be the only one to use it (e.g.,
because she is the first one who gets to push the button). In this case, even if
they have no prior knowledge of each other, they can still become associated, so
that from then on they share an asymmetric relation, one being a slave and the
other becoming its master. Other proposals are based on the notion of trust [2],
though we will not consider them here.
Another issue of great importance in the field of ubiquitous computing is that
of Coordination. Indeed, inherent to ubiquitous computing is the continuous
change of state of the different components that form a system, that need to
coordinate to achieve their goals. This fact, together with the unreliable nature
of ad hoc nets and the heterogeneity of the components make the orchestration
approach unrealistic and little robust, so that a choreographic coordination is
more advisable in this setting. Therefore, a key technology is service discovery,
which nowadays is based on a heavy standardization [12] (as in Sun’s Jini or in
Microsoft’s UPnP).
In this paper we develop a formal model for choreographic coordination in
ubiquitous systems, with primitives implementing the resurrecting duckling po-
licy. The model, called TSA, is based on Petri nets [3]. By using Petri Nets we
obtain an amenable graphical representation of our systems, together with a
number of theoretical results for their analysis, which would not hold in other
more expressive models. In particular, we will prove that TSA specifications can
be seen as a syntactic sugar formalism for P/T nets. Moreover, we will see that
we can implement TSA systems by means of Mobile Synchronizing Petri Nets,
which can be seen as a class of Coloured Petri Nets [8] with a single colour of
pure names [6], and syntactic sugar for mobility, except for the fact that they
can create fresh names, in a way borrowed from pi-calculus [9]. We have proved
several useful decidability results for them, which are inherited by TSA systems,
even though TSA systems may represent infinite state systems. In particular,
decidability of coverability in MSPN system implies that all the properties of
TSA systems which can be stated in terms of coverability are decidable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an over-
view of the Resurrecting Duckling policy. In Section 3 we define our model for
Transient Secure Association. Section 4 presents a simple example. In Section 5
we prove the simulation results and, finally, in Section 6 we present our conclu-
sions and directions for further work.
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Fig. 1. The resurrecting duckling policy
2 The Resurrecting Duckling policy
Let us briefly describe Transient Secure association and the Resurrecting Duck-
ling security policy model. Transient secure association is about creating a link
between two components, that establishes a master-slave relationship (typically
between a controller and a peripheral). This link needs to be secure, so that no
other principal can play the role of either the master or the slave. This produces
a tree topology of master-slave relationships between components. The associa-
tion must also be transient, in the sense that the topology can change if desired
(by the master) along the execution of the system.
The Resurrecting Duckling policy model implements transient secure associa-
tion with the following metaphor: A duckling that emerges from its egg recognizes
as its mother the first moving object that emits a sound. From then on, the duck-
ling obeys its mother duck until its death. Similarly, a peripheral can recognize
as its mother duck the first entity that sends it a secret key, called imprinting
key, which it will use to recognize its master from then on. However, in order
to make this association transient, we assume that the duckling can die and re-
surrect, and then it can recognize as its mother duck a different entity, to which
it will be faithful from that point on.
The policy can be described as a list of four principles:
1. Two State principle. Entities can be either imprintable (dead) or imprin-
ted (alive). Imprintable entities can be imprinted by anyone and imprinted
entities only obey their mother duck.
2. Imprinting principle. The step from imprintable to imprinted is called
imprinting, and happens when an entity, from now on the mother duck,
sends a key to the duckling (see Fig. 1).
3. Death principle. The step from imprinted to imprintable is called death
(see Fig. 1). The default cause of death is the mother duck’s order to its
duckling to commit seppuku1, though other causes are envisaged, as death
by old age or by completion of a task.
4. Assassination principle. It must be uneconomical for an attacker to kill
a duckling (to cause its death).
1 Traditional ritual suicide from Japanese samurai
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Our aim is to define a model for ubiquitous systems, that we call TSA, based on
Petri Nets and with primitives implementing the Resurrecting Duckling policy.
It will be a variation of the one developed in [5]. A TSA system is essentially
a set of localized nets that can move between locations and can imprint other
nets, give orders to the nets they have previously imprinted, kill those nets, and
being imprinted or receive orders from its master when imprinted. In order to
define our model we have to specify some of the aspects of the policy that were
not still completely precise.
We assume that the different components of a system have a type, taken
from a set O. We use a special type > ∈ O for the type of components that need
not be imprinted to perform their potential behaviour (e.g., users). Components
can be dead or alive. Top or imprinted components are alive, otherwise they are
dead. Those alive components can imprint dead ones, thus creating an unique
and asymmetrical link between them. By asymmetrical we mean that from then
on the imprinted component becomes a slave of the other, doing everything its
master orders to it. However, when executing its code, the slave component can
as well imprint other components, thus creating a hierarchical relation between
components. Therefore, not only the component being killed becomes death, but
also all of its slaves and so on, recursively.
We assume that components can only be imprinted within a certain range,
that depends on the imprinting method being used (e.g., physical contact [17]).
We abstract from those particular methods and simply assume that the im-
printing can take place whenever both components are in the same location. In
particular, we assume that the key exchange that takes place when imprinting
a component is done in a secure way. Besides, a component can only give orders
to those slave components that are currently co-located with it.
Dually, a slave component can be killed by its owner only when they are co-
located. Thus, we are implementing the default variant of the death principle,
in which the death of the duckling is caused by the mother duck. Finally, we
assume that the principals can only interact with each other using the model’s
primitives, so that the assassination principle of the policy also holds, since
attackers cannot kill any duckling in a way not established by the policy.
We will use the set L, a set of location names. O is a set of component types,
with a special element > ∈ O. We use a set S for the syntactic primitives of the
standard used for coordination and A to denote autonomous actions. A contains
among others the labels go k for every k ∈ L. We denote S? = {s? | s ∈ S} and
S! = {s! | s ∈ S}. For m > 0, we denote by Labels(m) the set A∪S?∪
m⋃
i=1
({i}×
LabelsAuth), where LabelsAuth = S! ∪ {imprint(o) | o ∈ O \ {>}} ∪ {kill}.
Definition 1. A TSA component is a tuple N = (PN , TN , FN , λN , oN ) such
that PN and TN are disjoint finite set of places and transitions, respectively,
FN ⊆ (PN × TN ) ∪ (TN × PN ), λN : TN → Labels(m) for some m > 0 and
5oN ∈ O. We say that N has type oN , that m is the capacity of N , and we denote
by cap(N) the set {1, . . . ,m}.
A TSA component is a typed-labelled Petri net. The capacity of a component
represents the number of slaves it can have simultaneously imprinted. Its type o
is just a syntactic category, which can be intuitively understood as the type of
device it is (e.g., PDA, electronic note,...), as the imprinting protocol it uses when
being imprinted or both simultaneously. The labelling of the transitions of the net
establishes a partition in its transition set: Those transitions t with λ(t) ∈ A are
autonomous transitions, that is, those that can be executed in an autonomous
way, without needing to synchronize with others; If λ(t) ∈ S? the transition
is used to receive orders from their masters, when imprinted; Otherwise, we
have that λ(t) ∈ {i} × Labels(m). The set Labels(m) is the disjoint union of
m identical sets LabelsAuth, each of them used to communicate with a different
i-slave. If some net fires t with λ(t) = (i, imprint(o)) then some component of
type o is henceforth a i-slave of it. If λ(t) = (i, s!) then the firing of t instructs
the corresponding slave to perform action s?. Finally, if λ(t) = (i, kill) then
its i-slave is instructed to commit seppuku. Next we introduce these concepts
formally.
As usual, given a transition t we will denote by •t = {p | (p, t) ∈ F}, the set
of preconditions of t and by t• = {p | (t, p) ∈ F}, its set of postconditions. If
cap(N) = {1} and λ(t) = (1, `) we will simply write λ(t) = `.
Definition 2. A TSA system N is a set of pairwise disjoint TSA components.
Intuitively, the nets N with oN = > are components that need not be im-
printed in order to execute their actions. We will denote by PN the set of all
places in N and by TN the set of all transitions in N, or just P and T when there
is no confusion.
Next we define the part of the state of the system regarding the dependency
relations between its components.
Definition 3. Given a TSA system N, a dependency function of N is a partial
mapping R : {(N, j) | N ∈ N, j ∈ cap(N)} → N. A dependency function R
induces a dependency graph G(R) with set of nodes N and an arc from N to N ′
labelled by j if R(N, j) = N ′, in which case we say that N ′ is a j-slave (or just
a slave) of N in R.
We will call directed tree to any directed graph in which there is a node, that
we call root of the tree, so that for every node in the graph there is a single path
from the root to it. Therefore, a directed forest is a set of directed trees. Given
two nodes s and s′ of a directed forest, we will say s′ is a descendant of s if there
is a path in the forest from s to s′. Moreover, given a set A we will denote by
MS(A) the set of multisets with elements in A.
Definition 4. A marking of a TSA N is a tuple M = (M, loc, R), where M ∈
MS(PN), loc : N→ L and R is a dependency function of N such that:
6– G(R) is a directed forest,
– For every N ∈ N, if oN = > then N is not a slave in R.
Therefore, a marking is composed by an ordinary marking for Petri nets,
a function specifying the locality in which each component is present, and a
dependency function.
We will say a component N is alive in R if oN = > or it is a slave in R.
Otherwise, we will say it is dead. The components N and N ′ are co-located if
loc(N) = loc(N ′).
Now let us define the behaviour of TSA systems. In general, only alive com-
ponents can fire transitions. Next we define the firing of autonomous transitions,
that are as ordinary transitions in P/T nets, that remove tokens from precon-
dition and add them in postconditions, except that they are restricted to alive
components and can cause the movement of the executing net. We will denote
by + and − the multiset union and the multiset difference, respectively, to dis-
tinguish them from ∪ and \, the corresponding operations over sets.
Definition 5. Let N be a TSA system, M = (M, loc, R) a marking of N, N an
alive component in R, and t ∈ TN such that λ(t) ∈ A. We say that t is enabled
in M if •t ⊆ M . In that case we say that t can be fired and then the marking
(M ′, loc′, R) is reached, where:
– M ′ = M − •t+ t•.
– If λ(t) = go k then loc′(N) = k and loc′(N) = loc(N) for every N ′ 6= N .
Otherwise, loc′ = loc.
Now we define the firing of imprinting transitions. The net firing any of them
specifies the type it wants to imprint.
Definition 6. Let N be a TSA system, M = (M, loc, R) a marking of N, N and
N ′ an alive and a dead component in R, respectively, both co-located, and t ∈ TN
such that λ(t) = (i, imprint(oN ′)). We say that t is enabled in M if
– •t ⊆M
– (N, i) /∈ Dom(R)
Then t can be fired, to reach the marking (M ′, loc, R′), where M ′ =M − •t+ t•
and R′ extends R with R′(N, i) = N ′.
Therefore, the imprinted net must be dead in order to be imprinted, and of
the type required by the imprinting component. Moreover, the imprinting net
must not already have an i-slave net.
Let us now define the transitions that represent orders from masters to slaves.
Definition 7. Let N be a TSA system, M = (M, loc, R) a marking of N, N and
N ′ two co-located alive components such that N ′ is a i-slave of N in R. Let us
also consider t ∈ TN such λ(t) = (i, s!) and t
′ ∈ TN ′ such that λ(t
′) = s?. We
say that the pair of transitions (t, t′) is enabled in M if •t ∪ •t′ ⊆ M . Then the
pair (t, t′) can be fired, getting (M ′, loc, R) where M ′ =M − •t− •t′ + t• + t′•.
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Therefore, if N ′ is an i-slave of N then N can give orders to N ′, which is
formalized by a synchronous firing of two transitions. Finally, let us define how
a master can kill one of its slaves.
Definition 8. Let N be a TSA system, M = (M, loc, R) a marking of N, N and
N ′ two co-located alive components such that N ′ is a i-slave of N , and t ∈ TN
such λ(t) = (i, kill). We say that t is enabled in M if •t ⊆ M . Then t can be
fired, getting (M ′, loc, R′) where M ′ = M − •t+ t• and R′ is the result of
– removing (N, i) from the domain of R, and
– removing (N, j) from the domain of R, for every N descendant of N ′ in
G(R) and every j.
Therefore, all the components that depend of N ′ are also indirectly killed.
Notice that this is so even if those components are not co-located with N and
N ′. Alternatively, we could force N ′ to explicitly search and kill its slaves, and
so on, but this would not modify the potential behaviour of any of the so killed
components. This is so because these nets can perform two kind of actions:
autonomous actions, that could have been performed anyway before their death;
and synchronizations with its master, which will not happen after the seppuku
order.
We will use u, u′, . . . to range over transitions or pairs of transitions. Thus,
in any of the previous cases we will write M[u〉M′ if M′ is the result of firing u
in M.
Since alive components cannot be imprinted, and only alive components can
imprint, whenever the dependency graph is initially a directed forest, it remains
so. Therefore, we have the following result.
Proposition 1. If M is a marking of a TSA system N and M[u〉M′ then M′ is
also a marking of N.
Reachability for TSA systems is defined as expected. We say a marking
(M, loc, R) can be covered if there is a reachable marking (M ′, loc′, R′) such
that M ⊆ M ′, loc = loc′, Dom(R) ⊆ Dom(R′) and for every (N, i) ∈ Dom(R),
R(N, i) = R′(N, i). The coverability problem consists on deciding if a given
marking can be covered.
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Fig. 3. Thermometer controller
4 An application example
In this section we present a simple application example to illustrate the defini-
tions in the previous section. Let us consider a scenario with several patients in
two rooms of a hospital, called k1 and k2. Each of the patients has an electronic
thermometer [19] that reads the temperature every once in a while, and willing
to send (e.g., using RFID) a message stating whether everything is all right or
not. We assume that these thermometers are inactive (that is, dead according
to our terminology), except when a thermometer controller takes over them.
Intuitively, we assume that every room has one of these controllers, that reads
the messages output by thermometers, and sends an alarm message to a nurse
whenever the temperature is not correct. For simplicity, we assume that all these
controllers are in fact part of a single component that moves between rooms in
the hospital and that it can only simultaneously control two thermometers, so
that it has capacity two.
Finally, there is a night shift nurse, that must check the temperature of the
patients. For that purpose, it may imprint a controller, so that she is the only
one to receive alarm messages from it. Therefore, the life cycle of a night-shift
nurse consists on going from her home to the infirmary, imprinting a thermome-
ter controller, going to rest, checking the patient in case she receives an alarm
message, or killing the controller and going back home.
We model this scenario by means of a TSA system with several components.
The first one, shown in Fig. 2, represents the nurse, that we assume has type
>. Initially, it is located in location home. Then it can fire go inf , thus moving
to the infirmary, where it can imprint the thermometer controller and then go
to rest. Notice that, since the nurse has capacity one, we use simple names as
labels of its synchronizing transitions, such as kill , instead of (1, kill).
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The thermometer controller, with type contr , is shown in Fig. 3, initially
in location inf . The controller, however, does not have a > type, so that it
must wait to be imprinted to perform any action. After been imprinted, it can
go either to location k1 or to k2. In these locations there are patients, all of
them like that in Fig. 5. Now the controller has a choice between good !, bad !
or imprint(th). However, since the patient thermometers are still dead (in our
sense), all the controller can do at the present time is imprinting them. Then
it can again choose between any of the locations. If it goes back again to the
same place then it can read the thermometer and, if it reads bad , that is, if it
synchronizes with the thermometer in transition bad !, then it goes to the rest
room and sends an alarm message to the nurse.
Eventually, the system will reach a dependency state like the one shown in
Fig. 4, with both thermometers imprinted by the controller. At any point, the
nurse can fire its kill transition, thus killing the controller (and, recursively, the
controller killing its thermometers). Notice that the controller does not have any
killing transition, so that it only kills its thermometers when, in turn, the nurse
kills it.
5 Verification of TSA systems
In the previous sections we have presented a model that allows us to specify
systems using primitives that implement the resurrecting duckling policy, which
are correct by definition. In this section we will see how we can use the known
decidability results for the verification of the obtained TSA systems.
First of all, we will prove that the locality component of TSAs is not essential
in the model. More precisely, we will say a TSA system is centralized if none of its
components have movement transitions and all of them are initially located in the
same location. Under these assumptions, we can ignore the locality component
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of centralized TSA systems, thus writing just (M,R) instead of (M, loc, R). In
the following result we will write Ac to denote the set A \ {go k | k ∈ L}.
Lemma 1. Every TSA system can be simulated by a centralized TSA system.
Proof. Let N be a TSA system. Given N ∈ N we will define the centralized TSA
component N∗, so that the centralized system N∗ = {N∗ | N ∈ N} simulates N.
Let K = {k | ∃t ∈ TN, λ(t) = go k}∪ loc0(N) ⊆ L, which is the set of localities in
which components can reside in any reachable marking. Since that set is finite,
we can add for each component N one place N@k per locality k ∈ K, all marked
in mutual exclusion, thus representing the current locality of each component as
part of its ordinary marking. Then, for each non-autonomous transition we will
consider also one per locality, so that a transition t being fired in k is represented
by the firing of a transition t(k). The place N@k must be a pre/postcondition
of transition t(k), and movement transitions must change the tokens in the new
places accordingly. Then, if N = (P, T, F, λ, o) we take N∗ = (P ∗, T ∗, F ∗, λ∗, o),
where
– P ∗ = P ∪ {N@k | k ∈ K}
– T ∗ = {t ∈ T | λ(t) ∈ Ac} ∪ {t(k) | λ(t) /∈ Ac, k ∈ K}
– F ∗ = {(p, t) ∈ F | λ(t) ∈ Ac} ∪ {(t, p) ∈ F | λ(t) ∈ Ac} ∪ {(p, t(k)) | (p, t) ∈
F, λ(t) /∈ Ac}∪{(t(k), p) | (t, p) ∈ F, λ(t) /∈ Ac}∪{(N@k, t(k)), (t(k), N@k) |
k ∈ K, λ(t) 6= go k′} ∪ {(t(k), N@k′) | λ(t) = go k′}
– λ∗(t) = λ(t) and λ∗(t(k)) = λ(t)
We assume that a transition in the simulating centralized system labelled by
go k is just an autonomous transition. For a given reachable marking M =
(M, loc, R) we define M∗ = (M∗, R), where M∗(p) = M(p) for every p ∈ P ,
M∗(N@loc(N)) = 1 and M∗(N@k) = 0 if k 6= loc(N) for every N . Then, it
holds that
M1[u〉M2 ⇔M
∗
1
[u∗〉M∗
2
where, if M1 = (M1, loc1, R1) then
u∗ =


u if λ(u) ∈ Ac
u(k) if λ(u) = go k′
(t(k), t′(k)) if u = (t, t′) ∈ TN × TN ′ , loc1(N) = loc1(N
′) = k
Therefore, in the following we can assume that every TSA system is centra-
lized. Now, we prove that every TSA system can be simulated by a P/T net.
Proposition 2. Every TSA system can be simulated by a P/T net.
Proof. According to the previous result we can assume that we are given a
centralized TSA system N with initial marking M0 = (M0, R0), and we must
construct the P/T net N∗ = (P ∗, T ∗, F ∗,M0) that simulates it. Let us first in-
troduce some notations. We write OK(t, t′, R) whenever t ∈ TN , t
′ ∈ TN ′ and
both N and N ′ are alive and N ′ is a slave of N , according to R. Analogously,
we write OK(t,N,R) whenever λ(t) = imprint(oN ) and N is dead according to
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Fig. 7. Translation of the TSA system in Fig. 6
R, or whenever λ(t) = kill and N is alive according to R. Finally, given a depen-
dency function R, we will write R(t,N) to denote the dependency function that
results when firing t with N as goal. More precisely, if λ(t) = (i, imprint(oN ))
then R(t,N) is the result of adding to R, R(N ′, i) = N , where t ∈ TN ′ . Analo-
gously, if λ(t) = (i, kill) then R(t,N) is the result of removing (i,N ′) from the
domain of R, as well as every descendant of N .
In order to simulate a TSA system by means of a P/T net, for each com-
ponent N we add places dead(N) and alive(N), marked in mutual exclusion,
thus stating whether that component is dead or alive. Since there are a finite
number of components and each of them has a finite capacity, there is only a
finite number of dependency functions. Then we can have one place for each one
of them, also marked in mutual exclusion, and used to restrict synchronizations
to happen only in the right configurations. For instance, for each pair (t, t′) of
synchronizing transitions labelled respectively by s? and (i, s!) we consider for
every dependency function R the transition (t, t′, R) that represents the synch-
ronized firing of (t, t′) in a dependency state R. Of course, this synchronization
can only happen when the net firing t′ is an i-slave of the one firing t′ according
to R. Therefore, this transition must have R as pre/postcondition, as well the
preconditions and postconditions of both t and t′. An analogous construction
applies to killing and imprinting transitions.
Then, let us take:
– P ∗ = PN∪{alive(N), dead(N) | N ∈ N}∪{R | R dependency function of N}
– T ∗ = {t ∈ TN | λ(t) ∈ A}∪
{(t, t′, R) | λ(t) = s?, λ(t′) = (i, s!), OK(t, t′, R)}∪
{(t,N,R) | OK(t,N,R)λ(t) = kill or λ(t) = imprint(oN )}
– F ∗ = F1 ∪ F2 ∪ F3, where
• F1 = {(p, t) | λ(t) ∈ A, p ∈
•t} ∪ {(t, p) | λ(t) ∈ A, p ∈ t•} ∪
{(alive(N), t), (t, alive(N)) | t ∈ TN}
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• F2 = {(p, (t, t
′, R)) | p ∈ •t ∪ •t′} ∪ {((t, t′, R), p) | p ∈ t• ∪ t′•} ∪
{(R, (t, t′, R)), ((t, t′, R), R) | (t, t′, R) ∈ T ∗}
• F3 = {(p, (t,N,R)) | p ∈
•t} ∪ {((t,N,R), p) | p ∈ t•} ∪ {(R, (t,N,R)) |
(t,N,R) ∈ T ∗} ∪ {((t,N,R), R(t,N))} ∪ {(alive(N), (t,N,R)) | λ(t) =
kill}∪{((t,N,R), dead(N)) | λ(t) = kill}∪{(dead(N), (t,N,R)) | λ(t) =
imprint(oN )} ∪ {((t,N,R), alive(N)) | λ(t) = imprint(oN )}
Finally, given a marking M = (M,R) of N we define the marking M∗ of N∗ as
follows:
– M∗(p) = M(p) for every p ∈ PN
– M∗(R) = 1 and M∗(R′) = 0 for every R′ 6= R
– N∗(alive(N)) =
{
1 if N alive in R
0 otherwise
– N∗(dead(N)) =
{
1 if N dead in R
0 otherwise
Using these notations, it holds that
(M1, R1)[u〉(M2, R2)⇔ (M1, R1)
∗[u∗〉(M2, R2)
∗
where u∗ =


t if u ∈ TN and λ(t) ∈ A
(t, t′, R1) if u = (t, t
′)
(t,N,R) if u = t and λ(t) = kill or λ(t) = imprint(oN )
Figure 7 shows the P/T net that simulates the TSA system in Fig. 6, assu-
ming that the net in the right has type o. In it we use place R1 for the dependency
function in which there is no associations between components, and R2 for that
in which the component in the left of Fig. 6 is master of the one in the right.
Then, the transition labelled by imprint can only be fired when there is a token
in R1, and that firing has the effect of moving that token from R1 to R2, as
well as moving the token in p0 to p1. The killing transition has an analogous
behaviour. Finally, transitions s! and s? are merged into a single transition s,
that has R2 as a pre/postcondition place, because it can only happen when both
components are associated, and it does not change this association. This cons-
truction, even for the simple example shown here, produces the typical spaghetti
problem of P/T nets, though, fortunately, it can be carried out automatically.
By applying this result, we can use all the existing machinery for ordinary
P/T nets in the analysis of our systems. For instance, coverability2 and home
state problems are known to be decidable for P/T nets (for a survey see [4]).
Then, in principle, we could algorithmically check any property that can be
stated in terms of them. For example, regarding the example in the previous
section, we could check that, whenever a thermometer is imprinted by a doctor,
then whenever needed it eventually raises the alarm, and only to the right doctor,
since that is a home state property. Another property that could be interesting
2 In fact, the construction translates coverability problems of TSA systems to finite
sets of coverability problems of P/T nets.
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to analyze, and can be stated in terms of coverability (adding a control point
to the specification), is checking that it is not possible for a controller to (for
example) send out an alarm message without first been imprinted. If we assume
that we have several nurses like the one in Fig. 2 and several controllers like the
one in Fig. 3, we could also specify in terms of coverability the property that
says that any nurse has at most one controller.
So far, we are regarding our TSA systems as the specification of systems
using the resurrecting duckling policy, since our primitives assume that the im-
printing and killing mechanisms are always correct. However, it is also desirable
to perform a lower level analysis, with weaker assumptions. For that purpose,
we will prove that every TSA system can be implemented by an MSPN system.
An MSPN system intuitively consists on a set of Petri nets, each of them at
some location. Those nets can move between location and, synchronize between
them. Moreover, and this is more important, they can manage pure names (in
the sense of [6]), that we call identifiers, and use them for authentication purpo-
ses, that is, as imprinting keys. Therefore, apart from ordinary tokens, MSPN
components can have identifiers as tokens. For instance, a component could offer
a synchronization only to components exhibiting a determined identifier. This
is formalized by using variables as labels on arcs. MSPN components can also
create fresh identifiers by means of a special variable ν, which can only be ins-
tantiated to fresh identifiers. However, they do not need to use this variable to
implement TSA systems.
Proposition 3. Every TSA system can be simulated by a MSPN system without
name-creation transitions.
Proof. Let N be a TSA system, that we can assume to be centralized. For every
N = (P, T, F, λ, o) ∈ N we want to define a MSPN N∗ in such a way that
the MSPN system N∗ = {N∗ | N ∈ N} implements N. The main difference
with the previous result is that components cannot have a global view of the
dependencies in the system, but only of those that affect them directly, that is,
they only know which components are their master and their slaves. For that
purpose, we add a place master to every component, containing at each time
the key used to communicate with its master. Similarly, if a net has capacity
m then we add places slave(1), . . . , slave(m), used to communicate with the
corresponding slaves. We represent alive components as those that contain a key
in its master place. Since only alive components can execute actions, we must
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Fig. 10. Implementation of imprintings
type > are always alive though they do not have a master and hence they must
have a key in that place, though they do not use it to communicate). We also add
a place dead , marked with an ordinary token in mutual exclusion with master .
Finally, we add a place free that contains a set of keys that are free to be used
in future imprintings. If the component has capacity m and does not have any
slave in the initial state, then that place must contain m pairwise different keys
in that place in its initial marking.
Now let us see how we implement the transitions of each kind. Autonomous
transitions are left as they are, except for the fact already mentioned that they
have the master place as precondition and postcondition, so that they can only
be fired when the component is alive and stay that way after it.
The synchronization of two transitions (see Fig. 9), labelled by (i, s!) and s?,
respectively, is implemented by the synchronization of two transitions, now labe-
lled by s! and s?. However, we want them to synchronize only when they share
the proper dependency relation. For that purpose we add the place slave(i) as
precondition (and postcondition) of (i, s!) and the place master as precondition
(and postcondition of s?, and label all those arcs with the same variable. In this
way, only components that contain the same value in those places (share the
same key) can communicate.
Therefore, we have to guarantee that components only share values whenever
told by the imprinting and killing primitives. In the implementation, imprinting
and killing transitions are just ordinary synchronizing transitions, so that we
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Fig. 11. Implementation of the TSA system in Fig. 8
assume there are synchronizing labels kill and imprint(o) for every o ∈ O. The
imprinting of a component of type o is implemented by the synchronized firing
of two transitions, labelled by imprint(o)! and imprint(o)? (see Fig. 10). Notice
that the latter transition can only be fired by dead components, so that in
fact it is the only transition that has the place dead as precondition instead of
master . When these two synchronize, a token is taken from the free place in the
imprinting component and placed both in the corresponding slave(i) place and
in the master place of the imprinted component.
The behaviour of the implementation of the killing transitions is dual, by
means of the synchronization of two transitions labelled by kill ! and kill?. Ba-
sically, the killing net moves the token in the corresponding slave(i) place and
puts it in free, and the killed net removes its token from master and puts a black
token in dead . However, the killing of a component causes the death not only of
that component, but also of all its slaves. Therefore, before putting that token
in place dead it must kill all its slaves.
MSPN systems without name-creation are still equivalent to P/T nets, so
that we can take advantage of all the existing analysis methods for P/T nets
even in the implementation of TSA systems as closed systems.
The previous proof profits from the fact that we are regarding TSA systems
as closed systems, so that we can extensively and statically analyze all of their
participants. In particular, we can check (and force) that the components being
imprinted, that is, receiving their masters imprinting key, throw away those
keys when they are killed. Therefore, components can safely reuse those keys in
a forthcoming imprinting.
However, it is not very realistic to assume in the context of ubiquitous com-
puting that we are dealing with closed systems. In this context, we want our
services to be offered in a global and uniform way, so that some of the principals
that imprint or some of the devices that are imprinted may not be part of the
system, but part of the environment of the system. In this case, we can no longer
check (even less force) that they erase the imprinting keys after been killed so
that, if we reuse them, then the principals of the environment could use old keys
to illegitimately interact with a component.
Let us again consider the simple TSA component in Fig. 8 or, more precisely,
its implementation as an MSPN system (without name creation) in Fig. 11. This
component attempts to imprint some device of type o, then uses some service
s that this device provides and finally kills it, thus moving to its initial state.
If this component is in an environment like the one in the left of Fig. 12 then
its behaviour is the intended one. Indeed, when being killed by its master, that
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component throws away the imprinting key (the identifier in place master), so
that it can be safely reused.
However, let us suppose that its environment is like the one in the right of the
same figure, which is almost the same, except for the fact that it does not throw
away that identifier (there is no arrow from place master to transition kill?) and
can provide service s even after synchronizing in transition kill (which, in this
case, does not have the effect of killing the component). Therefore, Fig. 11 would
be a wrong implementation of the TSA system in Fig. 8, when considered in the
environment in the right of Fig. 12. For more details about open MSPN systems
see [16]. However, we can make use of the fresh-identifier creation capability of
MSPN systems to perform a correct implementation, even in the open case.
Proposition 4. Every TSA system can be simulated by an open MSPN system.
Proof. The construction is identical to the one of the previous result, except for
the fact that when impriting, keys are not taken from a place free, but created
and when killing they are not put back in free, but erased.
Figure 13 shows the open implementation of the TSA system in Fig. 8, which
is similar to that in Fig. 11, except for the fact that it does not have a place free
for free identifiers and that it has the special variable ν labelling the arc to the
place called slave. This special variable formalizes the creation of new identifiers,
by forcing its instantiation only to identifiers that are not in the current marking.
In particular, notice that the environment on the right of Fig. 12 can no longer
offer service s after being killed, even if it does not throw away its key, since in a
new imprinting the TSA component will use a different imprinting key in order
to communicate with its slave.
As we have proved in [14, 16], the general class of MSPN system (in which
we allow name creation) is not equivalent to P/T nets anymore, but are not
Turing-complete either. In particular, we have proved that coverability is still
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decidable, even in the open case, so that we can still verify any property that
can be stated in terms of it.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have defined a model based on Petri Nets that addresses the
problem of Secure Transient Association in ubiquitous systems. The fact of using
Petri Nets gives us an amenable and easy to grasp model.
Then we study whether we can approach the problem of the verification the
properties of these systems. As a first step, we prove that TSA systems, seen as
specification of systems using the primitives of the Resurrecting Duckling Policy,
are equivalent to P/T nets, so that we have many decidable properties for them
as reachability, coverability or home state.
Then we show how these primitives can be implemented solely relying on
a mechanism that manages pure names, that can be seen as imprinting keys.
These implementations can be studied from two different points of view: first
assuming that our systems work in a closed environment, and then without
this assumption. In the first case, we have proved that this implementation is
still equivalent to P/T nets. However, this is no longer true in the second case,
because we need to allow the creation of fresh identifiers, but even so we can
approach the verification of their properties.
As future work, we plan to study in a more systematic way the kind of pro-
perties of TSA systems that can be studied. It would also be interesting to follow
a dual approach, namely that in which we want to verify that a given system
does indeed implement the resurrecting duckling policy, which would certainly
lead us to approaches like proof carrying code [11] or dynamic typing [7]. We also
plan to consider the studies about transactions in the context of Petri nets [1],
to apply them to killing of slaves in our model, which are clearly transactions,
though we do not treat them explicitly as such in the open implementation with
identifiers.
Another direction for future work is that of extending the basic model with
other features, such as allowing unbounded capacities for some componentes
(e.g., users), other causes of death, or a finer treatment of localities.
In [15] we presented a tool for the verification of MSPN system, based on
rewriting logic. We are currently extending this prototype to make it cope with
the primitives presented in this paper, so that it automatically performs the
translations we have described in the paper and check the properties that we
have proved to be decidable using those translations.
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